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Abstract
Stále se zvyšující zájem o Internet ovlivňuje i nárůst reklam. Skoro všechny webové
stránky obsahují nějakou formu reklamy, která umožňuje uživatelům přístup k bezplat-
nému obsahu a vlastníci stránky si tím vydělají na její provoz. Obecně je reklamní
byznys místo, kde se soustředí velké množství financí.
Rostoucí zisky z internetové reklamy přitahují čím dál více útočníků, kteří aktivně
hledají nové zranitelnosti systémů, aby mohli jejich uživatele infikovat malwarem.
Zisky útočníků jsou zejména spojeny s počtem falešných kliknutí na reklamy, což je
motivuje vyvíjet nebezpečný software. Ten generuje velké množství požadavků simu-
lující tato kliknutí. Požadavky zatěžují internetové spojení, zpomalují zařízení oběti,
negativně ovlivnňují její zážitky strávené na internetu a mohou narušit její soukromí.
V této práci jsme navrhli detektor anomálií, jehož důležitou částí je rozpoznání re-
klamy v síťovém provozu. Ukázali jsme, že běžně používané listy pro blokovani reklamy,
jako Yoyo ad-block list nebo EasyList ad-block list, jsou velice limitované a těžko se
rozšiřují o nové reklamní sítě. Proto jsme navrhli algorithmus pro detekci reklamního
provozu, který je schopný odhalit desetkrát více reklam než dříve zmíněné blacklistovací
listy. Navíc nevyžaduje žádný lidský zásah ani ruční doplňování nové znalosti, protože
může být opakovaně spouštěn a objevit tak nové reklamní sítě.
Nakonec jsme navržený detektor anomálií otestovali na HTTP a HTTPS z reálného
síťového provozu shromážděného z firemních sítí.
Klíčová slova
Detekce anomálií, Detekce reklamy, Adware, Click fraud
viii
Abstract
The explosive growth in the size and use of the Internet is followed by the growth of
ads. Almost all popular web pages contain advertisement, which plays a vital role in
supporting free websites by generating revenue for placing the advertisement. Therefore,
the online advertisement can be a lucrative business for a website with high visibility.
The increasing revenue of the online advertisement attracts more and more attackers
who are interested to explore new vulnerabilities to find new ways to infect the broad
audience with adware.
The attacker’s revenue is mainly related to the amount of fake impression, which
motivates them to create malware that generates a large number of advertisement
requests. This wastes the bandwidth, it can slow down user’s device, and negatively
impacts the user experience while browsing the Internet and disturbs the user’s privacy.
We propose anomaly detector for advertisement fraud detection on the network level
from the network behaviour. The important part of the proposed anomaly detector
is advertisement traffic detection, where we show that current blacklisting methods
are limited as they can not effectively cover the increasing number of ad-servers and
ad-networks. We propose an algorithm to detect ad-related HTTP/HTTPS requests
captured by web proxies. This algorithm can detect ten times more ads than the
conventional pattern matching approaches like Yoyo and EasyList ad-block lists, and
will not need any human interventions nor manual updates. It can be periodically run
to detect new ad-servers and ad-networks.
Finally, we evaluated the proposed anomaly detector on HTTP and HTTPS traffic
from real network data collected in a number of corporate networks.
Keywords
Anomaly detection, Advertisement detection, Adware, Click fraud
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1 Introduction
The explosive growth in the size and use of the Internet gives the advertisers oppor-
tunity to reach significantly more consumers through online advertisement compared
to traditional advertising. The amount of online advertisement is significantly growing
every year as the advertisement is an essential part of the Internet because it drives it’s
economy. Almost all popular web pages contain advertisement, which plays a vital role
in supporting free content websites. Even the advertiser’s community grows every year
as it is easy for anybody to create an account with major providers, such as DoubleClick
and the advertisement can be immediately promoted.
The advertisers are motivated to use online advertisement because the process of ad-
vertisement delivery to the audience is becoming more effective and more sophisticated,
as it is based on user behaviour on the Internet. This helps advertisers promote effec-
tively and target important part of potential customers. This leads online advertising
to grow into multi billion-dollar business [1].
The increasing revenue of the online advertisement attracts more and more attack-
ers who are interested to explore new vulnerabilities to find new ways to infect the
broad audience with the adware. Malware monetisation via fraudulent advertisement
traffic is lucrative, relatively easy, and growing structure of the Internet. Online ad-
networks, which are complex and generally not well described, but well funded, opens
new opportunities for fraudulent activities.
Once the attackers find the way how to infect a user with adware, there is an increased
chance that the adware escalates to higher severity threats.
However, the attacker’s revenue is mainly related to the amount of fake impression,
which motivates them to create malware that generates a large number of advertise-
ment requests, which wastes the bandwidth. Subsequently, the high number of adver-
tisement requests can slow down user’s device and negatively impact user experience
while browsing the internet and disturb the user’s privacy.
Whole advertisement fraud is driven by the conflict between different parties in ad-
vertisement delivery process, where each part wants to maximize it’s profit while other
parts are harmed by such behaviour.
For the unaware user, it is relatively easy to get infected because the infection can be
hidden even on popular web pages. Popular examples include the Yontoo browser plugin
which modified 4.5 million user’s private Facebook sessions to include an advertisement
that earned Yontoo $8 million [2]; and the New Your Time’s malvertising incident, in
which fake virus scanner was found on its home page [3].
Hence, it is important to detect these threats to be able to recognize them before
they cause vast damages.
In the first section of this chapter, we discuss the importance of online advertisement
by presenting its scale in numbers and online advertisement fraud in numbers. In the
second part of this chapter, we will summarize the reasons to detect online advertise-
ment, set up the problem and our goal in this area.
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Figure 1 Digital ad surpassed TV ad in 2017 [4].
Figure 2 Different types of online advertisement distribution [5].
1.1 Advertisement in Numbers
The increasing importance of the online advertisement supports the fact that the online
ad spends reached $209 billion worldwide in 2017. It was an important milestone
because it finally surpassed TV advertisement which spent $178 billion, according to the
research agency Magna Global. It is expected that this trend in the online advertisement
will continue in following years and possibly reach $348 billion in 2022, while TV will
stall as it is shown in Figure 1.
The advantage of online advertisement is that it is targeted to a specific user and
their needs and thus, it has better payback rate. The search advertisement, placed on
web pages that show result from search engine queries, takes the biggest chunk of digital
advertisement revenue, making up 40 percent share of the total revenue. The social
media advertisement, placed on social media web pages, and banner advertisement,
placed on the side, top, and bottom sections across different websites, follow with
significant distance as it is shown in Figure 2.
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1.2 Advertisement Frauds in Numbers
Fraud is an inseparable part of the online advertisement. The amount of global adver-
tising revenue wasted on fraudulent traffic, or clicks automatically generated by bots,
could reach $16.4 billion in 2017, according to a new study commissioned by WPP and
cited by Business Insider [6]. Some unofficial resources estimate even more. Never-
theless, it is more than double the $ 7.2 billion loss in ad fraud in 2016 according to
Association of National Advertisers estimation [7]. Whatsoever, the World Federation
of Advertisers predicted in 2016 that the advertisement spend would be $ 50 billion by
2025 [6].
1.3 Problem Setting
The problem of detecting adversarial advertisements is complicated by scale. With
millions of advertisers and billions of advertiser landing pages, the automated detection
methods are needed.
Our goal is to detect advertisement fraud on the network level where we have an
access to HTTP proxy logs later described in Chapter 5.1. We want to be able detect
users who are infected with malware, which generates a large number of advertisement
requests.
1.4 Goals of the Thesis
This main goals of this thesis are:
Survey state of the art approaches to online advertising frauds and meth-
ods of their detection.
The related work in analysis and detection techniques of advertisement frauds is
reviewed in Chapter 2. However, the amount of the research in this field is very limited
and mainly focused on the fraud detection from the ad-provider point of view.
Study the network communication processes of the advertisement delivery
using the information available in the HTTP access logs.
The online advertisement and delivery mechanism is depicted in Chapter 3. We
describe the mechanism of ad-exchange as it is currently the most popular approach of
advertisement delivery. In Chapter 4 we reverse the advertisement loading process to
get a hands-on overview about advertisement loading and redirection process.
Propose network behavioural features that can be used for advertising
fraud detection.
We propose method for advertisement detection in Chapter 6.4 which is later use for
ratio of number of advertisement flows in the user’s traffic and total number of users
flow. These features are used for modelling for behavioural detection of advertising
frauds,
Develop a model for behavioural detection of advertising frauds.
The model for behavioural detection of advertising frauds is described in Chapter 9.
We model the behaviour as the percentage of the ad-related traffic for each user in the
monitored network. The ratio of the individual user is compared to the ratios of all
other users in the network to asses the anomaly score of the user.
Evaluate proposed model using real network data captured from a number
of various networks.
Finally, we evaluated the proposed solution in Chapter 7.
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In this chapter, we review the related work in analysis and detection techniques of
advertisement frauds. The amount of research in this field is very limited and mainly
focused on the fraud detection from the ad-provider’s point of view. For the sake of
completeness we are going to cover those also even though they are not directly relevant
to this thesis.
2.1 Knowing Your Enemy: Understanding and Detecting
Malicious Web Advertising
Zhou Li at al. [8] analyse ad-related Web traces crawled over a three-month period.
They discover that top ranking Web sites fall victims of advertising fraud and leading
ad networks such as DoubleClick are infiltrated. They analyse the advertisement fraud
and show examples of advertisement fraud campaigns.
They study URL redirection chains in their analysis of advertisement fraud where
each URL is a node of redirection chain. They examine properties of advertisement
fraud paths searching for any node on the advertisement delivery path that performs
malicious activities. They identify prominent features from malicious advertising nodes
and their related content delivery paths. They annotate the set of features of one
delivery path as fraudulent if it was at least on of the URL from the redirection path
recognised as malicious by Google Safe-Browsing API or Microsoft Forefront 2010. They
divide available data set of features for obtained delivery paths into training and testing
data set and use it to for testing and training of proposed detection system MadTracer,
which adopt a statistical learning framework based on decision trees to automatically
generate a set of detection rules.
This approach cannot be applied to our problem because their data are captured
from the browser and they use the information from the content of Web pages. They
crawler over selected Web pages and they can derive what is the advertisement in the
Web page from the content and later they use this to build redirection paths only
from redirection which are caused by the advertisement. However, they discuss the
advertisement redirection property, which is useful knowledge for our research.
2.2 Detecting Adversarial Advertisements in the Wild
D. Sculley at al. [9] present a large-scale data mining mechanism that detects and
blocks adversarial advertisements. Their detection system combines tiered strategy,
automated and semi-automated methods to ensure reliable classification. Their solution
was deployed at Google for detecting and blocking adversarial advertisements in 2011.
This study stress following key challenges:
∙ The cost of both FP’s and FN’s is high. To address that they combine automated
and semi-automated ML principles to drive both rates towards zero.
∙ The vast majority of ads are from good-faith advertisers, thus detecting adversarial
advertisements presents a difficult class imbalances problem.
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∙ They have to rely on human experts for ground truth.
Their detection system learns from seven different types of features. They are based
on the text of advertisement keywords, properties and structure of landing page, features
extracted from the results of the HTTP fetch of the landing page, information about
links and redirects, and advertiser account information.
The proposed machine learning solution is designed as inherently multi-class. It is
based on sets of binary-class linear classifiers deployed as per-class classifiers. This
solution is mainly design to increase the effective impact of human experts and this
solution can reduce up to 50% of human experts time.
Despite, this solution cannot be applied on our problem, they discuss the problems
which appear with advertisement fraud detection such as high cost of both FP’s and
FN’s, class imbalance problem and necessity of human experts for ground truth.
2.3 Shady Paths: Leveraging Surfing Crowds to Detect
Malicious Web Pages
Gianluca Stringhini at al. [10] develop a system, called SPIDERWEB, which detects
Web pages that deliver malware. They use the browsers of a collection of web users to
record their interactions with websites, as well as the redirections they go through to
reach their final destinations. Thus, they do not develop features of a malicious web
page; they instead analyse how a large and diverse set of Web browsers reach these
pages and finally aggregate the different redirection chains that lead to a specific web
page and investigate the characteristics of the resulting redirection graph.
They build redirection graphs from HTTP redirection chains. The redirection graph
contains two types of entities, users and Web pages. A user entity includes information
about user IP, operating system, browser type and country. A Web page is represented
by following features: URL to the web page, the domain of the URL, length of the
domain name, IP of Web page and country. Then, they define redirection chain as a
tuple of the user visiting the redirection chain and graph of visited web pages and their
redirections, referrer (URL user is coming from), landing page (the Web page on which
the first redirection happens) and final page (the last Web page in the redirection chain).
They build redirection graph bases on this component and develop a set of 28 features
that describe the characteristics of a redirection graph. Finally, the SPIDERWEB
classifies each redirection graph and decides whether it is malicious.
They believe that SPIDERWEB complements previous work on detecting malicious
web pages since it leverages features that are harder to evade (graph-specific features
related to advertisement redirection chains). As they collect data from different users,
they use anti virus labels of user traffic as their ground truth. Thus, they have labels
for each set of extracted features and they use 10-fold cross validation to validate their
results. Their achieve F-measure score is equal to 0.881.
We cannot apply this approach because their study uses different data than are ours,
but they examine the advertisement redirection chains, which we study in this thesis.
2.4 Click-fraud Monetizing Malware: A Survey and Case
Study
Tommy Blizard and Nikola Livic [11] propose detail study of click fraud malware con-
taining study of click fraud motivation and different types of behaviour. They analyse
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mechanics of how specific malware executed click fraud.
They discover that each bot (infected user) has unique id created from observed
information about the victims machine. This id is used for communication with C&C.
The studied malware hook internet connections so when a victim searches via Bing or
Google it sends an encrypted blob containing the bot id, the search portal, the query
string of the search and an affiliate id. The affiliate id is used to track fraudulent clicks
generated by this instance of the malware to get credited to a a particular affiliate.
Then, the C&C sends a response back that includes a referrer, a URL and an agent.
These are used when the user clicks on an advertisement link from the search results
and one of the following situation happen. In 30% the user go to actual ad landing
page, 20% go to sub-syndicated search portal results, 30% go to non-germane site, and
15% to a different site of similar content. 5% returned error.
The goal of this study is the understanding of malware that monetises via click fraud
to help to build prevention systems for malware-generated click fraud in the future.
Nevertheless, they do not propose ML solution for detecting advertisement fraud,
however, they present a detailed study of click fraud behaviour, which is crucial knowl-
edge to understand the processes in advertisement fraud.
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The money in online advertisement increase every year, and it makes the online adver-
tisement a lucrative business. Not surprisingly, successful business is followed by fraud
and malware monetisation via fraudulent advertisement traffic is lucrative and rela-
tively easy. Unfortunately, fraudulent advertisement traffic decreases the computation
power of the infected machine and what more, it can lead to higher severity threats.
These impacts on online advertisement are a good reason to study online advertisement
fraud.
To correctly understand the various types of online advertisement fraud we need
to first understand the legitimate advertisement. The legitimate online advertisement
overview is in Section 3.1. The categorisation of different kinds of threats is in Sec-
tion 3.2.
3.1 Legitimate advertisement
The advertisement accompanies a significant amount of Web pages on the Internet. It
can appear as a banner advertisement on the side, top, and bottom sections of Web
pages. Another forms, which are for many users harder to recognise as an advertisement,
are a search advertisement, which is part of the search result of a search engine, and
social media paid content.
The online advertisement is so popular because it is advantageous for both sites. It
helps to generate revenue for the owners of the Web pages and to promote advertiser’s
advertisement. Appealing advertising messages, logos, animations, photos and graphics
are used to manipulate the audience to make them more receptive to advertised goods.
To increase the advertising effect, advertisers target audiences with particular traits
to improve the success rate of the advertising campaign to return their investment. The
users need to be profiled according to their interests to be able to serve targeted ads. A
common technique for user identification are cookies. Cookies are data stored on user’s
computers in a browser. Incomplete shopping information, unique user id generated
by a Website, data entered into the Web page (e.g. passwords, card numbers). This
information can be stored and used for session management, targeted advertisement,
personalisation or tracking. For example, a user can be re-targeted with unfinished
shopping list retrieved from the cookies while visiting some other pages via ads [12].
To make advertising campaigns more precise, advertisers collect data about user’s
online activity across multiple external Web pages. One Website can have none up to
dozens of trackers which can track the number of visitors, enable specific functionality,
or see where the visitor is coming from. The owner can use this information to insight
into his Web traffic, but the significant portion of trackers belong to companies whose
primary goal is to build up a profile of the user. Third party tracker tries to collect
data such as age, location, and interests. The personal data collected by the third
party tracker are packed and sold to advertisers or other companies. The advertisers
can collect the data and connect particular record by unique identifier for the user such
as a fingerprint of user’s browser [13]. Based on collected data, advertisers can use
7
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a) The initial page of www.dailymail.co.uk
with banner advertisement.
b) Explanation why certain advertisement was
shown to the user after clicking to
advertisement options in right top corner of
the banner.
Figure 3 Example of personalised advertisement from http://www.dailymail.co.uk.
observed behaviour of the user to choose targeted advertisement [14]. The example of
targeted personalised advertisement is in Figure 3.
Another option is to serve advertisement related to the context of the publisher’s
site [15] or to use geotargeting based on IP Address [16].
3.1.1 Advertisement delivery mechanism
Firstly, we describe the major parties of advertisement delivery mechanism. Secondly,
we describe three types of the advertisement delivery mechanism.
The advertisement delivery mechanism involves three major parties:
∙ Publishers are owners of some Web page where they display advertisement for
which they are paid. The usual business models for a publisher to calculate revenue
are pay-per-impression and pay-per-click model. The pay-per-impression is the
measure of cost that the publisher gets paid for advertising to a user. While the
pay-per-click is the measure of cost that the publisher gets paid for the ad-click of
a user.
∙ Advertisers are creators of the marketing messages (advertisement) which they
want to show to a large population through publishers Web pages. They are
the revenue sources of online advertisement because they pay for displaying their
advertisement on publishers Web pages.
∙ Audience are Internet users who visit publisher’s Web page and receive the adver-
tisement.
The advertisement exchange between publisher and advertisers can come in three
different scenarios:
∙ First, publishers can have in-house advertisement departments and own ad-servers.
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Figure 4 The advertisement exchange between publisher and advertiser when publishers have
in-house advertisement department and own ad-servers [18].
Figure 5 The advertisement exchange between publisher and advertiser when publishers out-
source an advertisement department to an advertising agency [18].
Figure 6 The advertisement exchange between publisher and advertiser when publishers offer
their space to the ad-networks [18].
The publishers have their agreement with advertisers and directly use their adver-
tisement [17]. This scenario is in Figure 4.
∙ Second, publishers can outsource an advertisement department to an advertising
agency and publish the advertisement from the agency’s ad-servers [18]. This
scenario is in Figure 5.
∙ Finally, publishers can offer their ad space to the ad-networks. The ad-exchange
is a real-time bidding market that facilitates the buying and selling of media ad-
vertising inventory from multiple ad-networks. This is the most popular approach
which is discussed in detail in the following section. This scenario is in Figure 6.
3.1.2 Mechanism of ad-networks
The description of the mechanism of ad-networks in this section follows the visualisation
in the Figure 6. The advertisement loading process starts when a user’s browser requests
content of a Web page through publishers content server that answers with a Web page
content containing links to the publisher’s ad-server. User’s browser sends the request
for the advertisement together with the information about the user from cookies to the
publisher’s ad-server which will resent this information to a supply-side platform server
(SSP).
SSP acts as a technical interface between the publisher, advertiser, and ad exchange.
It can bring unsold inventory to many ad exchange markets at once and simplify the
complexity of ad-network relationships for the publisher [19].
9
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SSP servers enrich the data based on user identification with data from the data
management platform DMP.
DMP is data warehouse which collects data about users, sorts them and splits it in a
way that is useful for serving advertisement such as demographic information, previous
purchases, and other data related to the customer behaviour [20]. This package of
information about the user, his behaviour, and publishing site is forwarded to the ad-
exchange.
The ad-exchange offers this opportunity to demand-site platforms (DSP).
DSP acts on behalf of ad agencies, who sell ads of different brands. Thus, DSPs
searches for the right advertisement for the right user at the right time. DSP receives
all the information about the user and has to decide in 10 milliseconds if the user is
suitable for their advertisement and how much they can bid to buy the ad space.
Then the ad-exchange selects DSP with the highest bid and passes the link through
the redirection chain back to the user’s browser, which requests the ad from the agency’s
ad server [17].
The top online ad-exchanges by ranker.com are OpenX, AdExpert, and DoubleClick.
3.2 Advertisement frauds
The goal of this thesis is to detect noisy advertisement fraud, which is caused by ad-
ware. Adware is malicious software bringing the unwanted advertisement to user’s
browser and displaying advertisements on user’s computer through malicious tool-bars,
ad-injection or invisible clicks on tons of advertisement and others. The advertisement
fraud categories caused by adware, we are interested in, are click fraud, impression ad-
vertisement fraud, click hijacking, ad-injection and online pop-up advertisement scams.
All these types of advertisement frauds generate large number of advertisement traffic
in order to gain a considerable amount of money. These frauds are described in detail
in following sections.
3.2.1 Click fraud
The click fraud is connected to pay-per-click revenue model. It can be caused by person,
automated script or computer program that imitates a legitimate user of a Web browser
clicking on an advertisement unintendedly. We speak about fraud because the advertiser
is paying for a clicks without receiving any true value.
We can distinguish two types of click frauds according to their intentions:
∙ We speak about inflationary click fraud if the advertisement appear at third-
party Web page with pay-per-click revenue model, then these third parties may
be interested in clicking the advertisement to inflate their revenues.
∙ We speak about competitive click fraud if advertisers are interested in clicking ri-
vals advertisement with the purpose of driving up their costs or exhausting their
budget. Once the advertiser budget is exhausted, the advertiser exits the adver-
tisement auction.
3.2.2 Impression advertisement fraud
The impression advertisement fraud is connected to pay-per-impression revenue model.
It is one of the most commonly seen advertisement fraud, which can appear in several
forms.
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∙ One form involves fabrication HTTP requests to either the publisher’s page or the
ad-server directly to artificially inflate the actual revenue.
∙ Another form of impression advertisement fraud is advertisement stacking. The
advertisement stacking is when advertisements are stacked on top of each other in
the same space but only the top advertisement is visible. However, the lower layer
with advertisements are reported as viewed advertisements to the advertiser, who
pay for unseen promotion.
3.2.3 Click hijacking
The click hijacking happen, when a user of an infected computer clicks on a search
result link displayed through a search engine query or clicks on something different
from what the user perceives they are clicking on, then the malware causes that the
users is brought to a different Website, usually designed by the attacker, instead of the
Website to which the user wants to go by clicking on a search result.
3.2.4 Ad-injection
Ad-injection is a technique, which secretly insert advertisement into Web pages without
the Web page owner permission and knowing. Thus, advertisement is displayed on the
owner Web page but he is not payed for it.
The ad-injection can have several forms:
∙ First, advertisement can be inserted on top of Web page content or advertise-
ments that are already on the Web page legitimately by making the original ads
impossible to see.
∙ Second, injected advertisement can replace other legitimately placed advertise-
ment, or appear on pages that were not supposed to include advertisement.
On top of this, ad-injectors frequently monitor all of a user’s browser activities, in-
cluding page interactions and search queries, which reports to third parties for tracking
and advertisement selection.
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process
In this Chapter, we explain the methodology of reversing the advertisement loading
process to get a hands-on experience with advertisement loading process and it’s redi-
rection chains. The understanding of advertisement loading process gives us a crucial
knowledge which is later used while designing the algorithm for advertisement detection,
which are explained in Chapter 6.
4.1 Methodology of capturing website loading process
The analysis of advertisement loading process is based on reversing network traffic of
Websites with different suppliers of advertisement. The goal is to explore advertisement
loading process and identify general patterns of advertisement requests.
The first step consists of finding websites for our analysis. For this purpose, we
use Wappalyzer [21]. The wappalyzer is a cross-platform utility that uncovers the
technologies used on websites in general. In our case, we use it for identifying different
ad-networks used on Websites. We restrict our analysis to top advertising networks
based on the statistics on wappalyzer.com. The statistics of top advertising networks
is in Figure [21].
The second step was to capture and analyse the network traffic generated by loading
process of selected Websites. The browser’s developer tool was used to capture the
traffic.
4.2 Analysis of Website loading process
Firstly, we collect set of URLs, which download advertisement pictures into examined
Websites for different suppliers of advertisement. The traffic was analysed and captured
through the browser as it shown in Figure 8. Examples of these URLs are in Table 1.
These URLs are the unique indicators that the advertisement is loaded. Unfortunately,
these URLs were impossible to generalise or use for a general advertisement detection
Figure 7 Top advertisement networks according to [21].
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https://tpc.googlesyndication.com/simgad/5502983634562170
https://s.adroll.com/a/73H/K7E/73HK7ERMARBMLBBITHHTHU.gif
files.cointraffic.io/pub/4670/11918.gif
https://vcdn.adnxs.com/p/creative-image/de/dc/6b/7d/*.jpg
http://pix.eu.criteo.net/img/img*
Table 1 Examples of advertisement pictures loading URLs.
algorithm. Therefore, we use these URLs later in our research as true positive labels
for our advertisement detection algorithm.
Secondly, all components of advertisement on the web page are encapsulated in the
iframe tag. The iframe tag specifies an inline frame tag, which is used to embed
another document within the current HTML document. The advertisement context is
dynamically loads the advertisement content to the website. Thus, we collect URLs of
sources of advertisement iframes. Interestingly, only URLs of a few suppliers appear in
examine Websites, which repeat and load the final advertisement pictures from different
ad-servers. Examples of the iframes supplier source’s URLs are in Table 2.
http://tpc.googlesyndication.com/safeframe/*
https://s0.2mdn.net*
https://a3275.casalemedia.com/ifnotify?*
Table 2 Examples of iframe loading URLs.
Finally, we prove our theory, that the advertisement content is referred by the iframe
source, by analysing the redirection chain of loading process of web pages. The redirec-
tion chain of loading process consists of edges that are represented as tuples (referrer,
host) or (host, location). We analyse the redirection chains in a two ways.
For analysis of redirection chain with full URLs, we develop the tree structure dis-
playing tool, which shows the relationship between loaded components into a website.
In Figure 10, we can see the subset of URLs needed to load arestechnica Website, where
a bunch of URLs, related to the advertisement, are referred by the source of the iframe,
"*.googlesyndication.com/safeframe/*".
For the analysis of hostnames, we use Gephi visualiser. In Figure 9, we can see the ad-
vertisement providers, as casalemedia.com, amoazon-adsystem.com or tcp.googlesyndication.com,
refer another advertisement parties, as gstatic.com, casalemecia.com, and many others.
The size of each node is based on the number of output edges, and the darkness of the
nodes is based on the number of incoming edges.
In Figures 10 and 9, we can see that the advertisement provider is always between
the website and an advertisement server. The advertisement provider can refer the
advertisement from different ad-servers.
Hence, we can understand the URL of iframe source as a advertisment provider
between the Web page and different ad-servers. Different Ad-networks are connected
to the Ad-exchange and based on their bid the advertisement is loaded with iframe
source URL as a referrer to the website. The principle of Ad-exchange was in depth
explained in Section 3. This crucial knowledge is used while designing advertisement
detection algorithm in Chapter 9.
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Figure 8 ArsTechnica analysis of advertisement element.
Figure 9 Tree structure visualisation tool: Part of ArsTechnica.com loading traffic URLs of
advertisement iframe and referred URLs of advertisement elements.
Figure 10 The redirection graph of hostnames from arstechnica.com loading process. The
advertisement providers, googlesyndication.com, casallemedia.com and others, refer the ad-
vertisement from different ad-servers.
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This section provides a detailed description of the dataset we use for the evaluation of
proposed algorithm. The data set consists of one week of network traces of 2 740 475
users from 636 companies. Particularly, we use one week from January. In spite of, our
data set contains only one week of the data, we already speak about this data as about
Big Data. The data contain features extracted from HTTP, HTTPS and inspected
HTTPS Web Access logs which were captured on the network perimeter. We describe
those in detail in the following sections.
5.1 Web Access logs
The access logs are records from CISCO Web Security Appliances [22]. It is a Web
proxy that inspects and then either forwards or drops web traffic based on reputation
filters or the outcome of inline file scanning.
The individual records contain information extracted from the HTTPS/HTTPS head-
ers of request and response pairs. In the following text we will denote the record as
flow.
5.2 Description of a single flow
Each flow contains features extracted from HTTP header, so the content of the re-
quests/responses is not inspected. Following fields are extracted from the header: user-
name, source IP address, destination IP address, source port, destination port, protocol,
number of bytes transferred from client to server and from server to client, flow dura-
tion, timestamp, user agent, URL, host, referrer, referrer host, location, location host,
MIME-Type, HTTP status, tag signifying whether the connection was blocked or not.
The number of extracted features is higher for non-encrypted traffic (HTTP) than for
encrypted traffic (HTTPS). In HTTPS, we do not have features as user agent, URL
host, referrer, referrer host, location, location host, MIME-Type and HTTP status. As
the amount of HTTPS traffic is increasing, we have to deal with the lower number of
known fields.
Another disadvantage of HTTPS flows is that it generates significantly fewer flows
than the HTTP traffic because for the HTTPS we can see only the initial connection to
set up the tunnel and the rest of the flows we do not see as it is shown in Figure 11. In
HTTP, we can see a bunch of flows while only one page is loading, because firstly the
HTML index of the web page is loaded and then the other parts referred in the index
are loaded. Hence, loading process of one web page can be 100-150 HTTP requests.
5.3 Inspection of HTTPS packets
The information in encrypted (HTTPS) flows is crucial. Hence, some companies inspect
the HTTPS connections. The inspection is computationally expensive, and therefore
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Figure 11 The HTTPS traffic is encrypted and we can see only the initial connection (lebeled
as tunnel in the Figure). To be able to see the flows from the encrypted connection some
proxies inspect the traffic.
only some HTTPS connections are inspected. The strategy, which packets will be
inspected, depends on company’s capturing strategy.
The inspection of HTTPS is executed by the men in the middle (MITM) proxy. Prox-
ied HTTPS requests are terminated by the proxy and resent to the remote webserver.
The server certificates presented to the client are dynamically signed by the proxy and
contain most of the same fields as the original webserver certificate. However, the issuer
distinguish name is now set to the name of the proxy’s self-signed certificate and the
public/private keys of the proxy are used in creating the forged certificate.
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The goal of this thesis is to propose network behaviour features and develop a model
for advertisement fraud detection. The crucial milestone in advertising fraud detection
is the differentiation between advertisement flows and non-advertisement flows in the
HTTP and the HTTPS access logs. This chapter describes methods of advertising
traffic detection which are the essential part of our advertising fraud detection solution.
First, we use available intelligence from the Internet, but the recall of these methods
is low. Therefore we develop own advertisement detection algorithm.
6.1 Pattern matching - Ad-block lists
The public intelligence about the advertisement is accumulated in ad-block lists typi-
cally used in Web browsers. The ad-block lists are sets of rules originally designed for
ad-block filters. These rules were manually co-created by the members of advertisement
crowdsourcing community.
The ad-block filters filter the content and block the advertisement on web pages.
It automatically removes unwanted content from the Web page, including annoying
advertisement, bothersome banners and troublesome tracking. The visualisation of Ad-
block behaviour is in Figure 12. The content of the Website is filtered with ad-block
filters, and then only the content of the Web page without the advertisement is shown
to the user. We use two ad-block lists, which are described in this section, Yoyo and
EasyList.
6.1.1 Yoyo ad-block list
The Yoyo ad-block list [24] contains about 2 600 rules for hostnames of ad-servers. The
example of such rule is "ad.doubleclick.com". The owner of the list is collecting these
hostnames to get rid of annoying advertisement by redirecting advertisement related
traffic to the local host.
But this detection technique has a low recall because with only 2 600 rules for host-
names it is possible to detect only a very small portion of advertisement flows.
Figure 12 Behaviour of ad-block filter [23]. The content of the website is filtered with ad-block
filters, then only the content of the website without the advertisement is shown to the user.
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6.1.2 EasyList
The EasyList ad-block list is the primary filter list that removes the advertisement from
international web pages, including unwanted frames, images and objects. It is the most
popular list used by many ad block filters [25]. The EasyList ad-block list contains set
of rules, which determine the addresses that are related to the advertisement. These
rules are more sophisticated than the ones used in Yoyo block list. The rules can detect
advertisement by following rules:
∙ Address part rule The regular expression searches for a certain pattern in the
path of the URL. For example the pattern ||ads.example.comˆ will detect this URL
http://example.com/banner/foo/img but will not detect this URL
http://example.com/banner/img as an advertisement.
∙ Domain name rule The regular expression searches for an exact match in the
domain name. For example the pattern ||ads.example.comˆ will detect this URL
http://server1.ads.example.com/foo.gif but will not detect this URL
http://ads.example.com.ua/foo.gif as an advertisement.
∙ Exact Address rule The regular expression searches for an exact match in the
URL. For example the pattern |http://example.com/| will detect only
http://example.com/. Everything else will not be labeled as an advertisement.
The biggest problem with EasyList is that it labels as an advertisement even URLs
which belong to different trackers and other non-advertisement servers.
6.1.3 Problems of the static patterns
The advantage of both lists is that they are maintained and continuously updated by
the community. But if the community behind them would fall apart, the rules would
outdate and would be no longer useful. Nevertheless, both have low recall on our data,
which is partially caused by small number of rules in each list. The yoyo ad-block list
has only 2600 rules for hostnames. Compared to yoyo ad-block list, the EasyList has
more rules, specifically 31930, but these rules have to be whitelisted with 5502 rules
because the rules can match even non-advertisement URLs as advertisement without
whitelisting.
The advantage of Yoyo rules is that it operates only on hostnames. Thus this list
works well even for HTTPS traffic, where we do not have the query and path parts of
the URL. Compare to that, EasyList ad-block list has just part of the rules oriented to
the hostnames, which works on HTTPS. Since the main portion of communication is
HTTPS in these days, part of this list can be used only restrictively.
The main problem of both ad-block lists is small coverage of advertisement flows.
When we analyse the data manually, we can see that the evident advertisement domains
are not labelled as the advertisement on a big scale (Section 7). The other problem is
that the lists have to be frequently updated because the number of advertisement paths
will increase with time and some paths and domains can change.
6.2 Advertisement Propagation Algorithm
The motivation for advertisement propagation algorithm is that we want to recognise
as much advertisement traffic as possible if we have only limited initial knowledge. If
the limited initial knowledge is extended by the algorithm, then even updates can be
done automatically, and no human maintenance is needed.
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We get the initial knowledge by reversing and analysing advertising loading process
as described in Chapter 4. We discovered that the advertisement was most frequently
loaded into the iframe element in the Web page which has very often the same source
with a clear pattern in the URL "http://tpc.googlesyndication.com/safeframe/*". This
URL loads the iframe code for the advertisement and the URL of the advertisement
content. The connection to the URL of advertisement content follows and it is referred
from the URL of the iframe. Thus, we labelled flows as the advertisement if it is referred
from this googlesyndication URL. Even though, this iframe source is very popular in
our research of advertisement loading process, it does not help us to label significantly
more advertisement in our data than with ad-block lists.
The most significant disadvantage of this approach is the fact that it can work only
on HTTP flows and inspected HTTPS flows which have the information about the
referrer.
The number of flows we are able to label as an advertisement with propagation of
advertisement from googlesyndication as a referrer was not sufficient enough to use it as
a label for advertisement flows, but it was sufficient enough to gain the advertisement
hostnames.
With our previous knowledge of ad-exchanges and advertisement loading process from
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we know that a publisher site has an agreement with the
advertisement provider or with more providers. The advertisement provider is a medi-
ator between the page owner and advertisement network. The advertisement provider
provides the infrastructure for automatic advertisement loading and the advertisement
itself and finally, he pays to the owner of the website for advertisement placement.
Thus the important consequence of this knowledge is that the advertisement can be
loaded from various ad-servers over the internet. Even if the demand site platform co-
operates directly with only limited amount of ad-servers, the demand side platform can
resell the advertisement of another demand site platform. Thus it makes the advertise-
ment network behind ad-exchanges even more complicated. The consequence is that
with such knowledge and only one advertisement provider, we can design an algorithm
to mine the advertisement networks.
The algorithm to mine the advertisement networks is composed of several partial
algorithms, which are described in following sections.
6.2.1 The Advertisement Propagation Algorithm
The advertisement propagation algorithm uses all available flows with information
about the referrer, the host and the knowledge of URLs of advertisement providers.
Thus, all HTTP and inspected HTTPS flows (section 5.3). In these flows, the al-
gorithm searches for flows, whose referrer match one of the advertisement providers
restriction, and collects the hostnames from these flows. The advertisement provider
restriction can be domain name of the advertisement provider or pattern of URL de-
fined as a regular expression, or restriction over another fields e.g. content type has
to be image. Then the occurrences of each hostname are counted, and only hostnames
with the occurrences higher than 100 are returned as the result of the algorithm. The
illustration of the behaviour of the algorithm is in the Figure 13.
We define the advertisement propagation algorithm in the following way. We have
initial set of web flows 𝐹 = (𝑓1, ..., 𝑓𝑛). Each web flow contains a set of information
about URL, host name and content type. It can optionally contain the information
about the referrer URL and referrer host name if it is HTTP or inspected HTTPS flow.
Then we have non-empty set of advertisement providers restrictions 𝐴 = (𝑎1, ..., 𝑎𝑛).
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Figure 13 The illustration of the advertisement propagation algorithm with only one adver-
tisement provider. The red dot is restriction on advertisement provider and the green dots
are propagated hostnames of ad-servers. The arrow 𝑥 −→ 𝑦 means the relation, 𝑥 refers 𝑦.
The advertisement provider restrictionis defined as a restriction over content type, URL
or hostname. We store all propagated ad-servers hostnames in list 𝑃 and in set 𝑄, we
store propagated hostnemes with their occurrences. The result of the Algorithm (1) is
a set of ad-server’s host names 𝑆.
Algorithm 1 The advertisement propagation algorithm
1: function advertisementPropagation(𝐹, 𝐴)
2: 𝑃 = {}
3: 𝑄 = {}
4: for all 𝑓𝑖 ∈ 𝐹 do
5: if 𝑓𝑖 has information about the referrer then
6: if 𝑓𝑖 satisfies one of the restrictions 𝐴 then
7: 𝑃 = 𝑃 ∪ {𝑓𝑖}
8: 𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒 ←extractDomainNameFromHostName(𝑓ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 )
9: if ∃𝑞𝑘 ∈ 𝑄 : (𝑞𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑘 equals 𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒) then
10: 𝑞𝑘 ← (𝑞𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑘 , 𝑞𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑘 + 1)
11: else
12: 𝑄 = 𝑄 ∪ {(𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒, 1)}
13: end if
14: end if
15: end if
16: end for
17: 𝑆 = {}
18: for all 𝑝𝑖 ∈ 𝑃 do
19: 𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒 ←extractDomainNameFromHostName(𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 )
20: if ∃𝑞𝑗 ∈ 𝑄 : (𝑞𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑗 equals 𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒) & (𝑞𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑗 > 100) then
21: 𝑆 = 𝑆 ∪ {𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 }
22: end if
23: end for
return 𝑆
24: end function
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Figure 14 The illustration of the advertisement back-propagation algorithm from ad-servers
hostnames from the advertisement propagation algorithm. The green dots are ad-servers and
sharp red dots are new advertisement providers. The arrow 𝑥 −→ 𝑦 means the relation, 𝑥
refers 𝑦.
6.3 Advertisement Back-propagation Algorithm
Initially, we ran the advertisement propagation algorithm described in Section 6.2.1
with only one advertisement provider using the restriction on a URL and a content
type. But as we explained in Section 6.2, the advertisement supplied to the web page is
not connected with only one advertisement provider. Thus instead of creating more ad-
vertisement provider restrictions manually, where we would need human maintenance,
we propose an algorithm for advertisement back-propagation, which generates the re-
strictions automatically.
We use the knowledge that the ad-network behind the ad-exchange is very compli-
cated, and it leads to the fact that one ad-server can sell his advertisement through
different advertisement providers. Therefore, once we have a set of hostnames of ad-
servers from the advertisement propagation algorithm, we can expect that at least part
of them will be referred by another advertisement provider in our data. Thus we can
extend input for our advertisement propagation algorithm.
The advertisement back-propagation algorithm uses all available flows with informa-
tion about the referrer and the ad-server hostnames generated by the advertisement
propagation algorithm. The algorithm checks hostname of each flow with the referrer
if the hostname matches with some of the ad-server hostnames from the input set. If it
matches, we extract the domain name of the referrer and store it with the number of
occurrences. Then, we take top fifteen domain names of advertisement providers. These
domain names can be used as an advertisement providers restriction in the following
advertisement propagation algorithm. We use domain names instead of hostnames be-
cause the low-level sub-domain of the advertisement provider hostname can vary for
big advertisement providers for each advertisement delivery. The illustration of adver-
tisement back-propagation algorithm is in Figure 14.
We define the advertisement back-propagation algorithm in the following way. We
have initial set of web flows 𝐹 = (𝑓1, ..., 𝑓𝑛). Each web flow contains a set of infor-
mation about URL, hostname and content type of targeted destination and it can op-
tionally contain the information about the referrer URL and referrer hostname. Then
we have non-empty set 𝑆 = (𝑠1, ..., 𝑠𝑛) of ad-servers hostnames as identified using
the propagation algorithm described in section 6.2.1. The result of the Algorithm
(2) is a set 𝐷 of advertisement provider’s domain names with number of occurrences
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𝑑𝑖 = (𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑖 , 𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖 ).
Algorithm 2 The advertisement back-propagation algorithm
1: function advertisementBackPropagation(𝐹, 𝑆)
2: 𝐷 = {}
3: for all 𝑓𝑖 ∈ 𝐹 do
4: if 𝑓𝑖 has information about the referrer then
5: for all 𝑠𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 do
6: if 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗 equals 𝑓ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 then
7: 𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒 ←extractDomainNameFromHostName(𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖 )
8: if ∃𝑑𝑖 ∈ 𝐷 : (𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑘 equals 𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒) then
9: 𝑑𝑘 ← (𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑘 , 𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑘 + 1)
10: else
11: 𝐷 = 𝐷 ∪ {(𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒, 1)}
12: end if
13: end if
14: end for
15: end if
16: end for
return 𝐷
17: end function
6.4 Advertisement Network Mining
In the previous sections, we describe the advertisement propagation algorithm and the
advertisement back-propagation algorithm. These algorithms are principal components
of the advertisement network mining algorithm that is described in detail in this section.
The network mining algorithm combines all our previous knowledge about the ad-
networks and the advertisement loading process. This algorithm shows how we are
able to gain 384 863 number hostnames of ad-servers with access to Big Data web
flows and the knowledge about only one advertisement provider. Because even non-
advertisement servers can be referred by the advertisement providers we propose the
automatic white-listing algorithm to clean the result of the network mining algorithm.
Firstly in this section, we describe the automatic white-listing algorithm, and then
we present the advertisement network mining algorithm with white-listing.
6.4.1 The Automatic White-listing Algorithm for network mining algorithm
As was previously mentioned, some hostnames, which are not ad-servers, can be referred
by the advertisement providers. This can happen due to the fact that the URL is related
to the advertisement delivery mechanism, but the indication of advertisement delivery
is in the path of the URL. Thus, if we take just hostname, we lose some information,
and the hostname itself can be mainly related to non-advertisement flows. Thus, such
label would generate false positive, and it is a problem if such hostname is for example
"google.com". Therefore we design the algorithm, which recognises such servers and
filters them out.
For the white-listing we take an advantage of the fact that user typically does not
reach the ad-server directly. Contraty, the non-ad-servers are accessed by the user
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directly without any redirection. Thus access to non-ad-server should be captured in
the flow data as a flow without referrer, and the URL should not contain any path.
On the other hand, access to an ad-server has these fields typically filled. Proposed
algorithm counts the number of occurrences the hostname appears in our data without
referrer and path in the URL because the non-ad-server hostnames appear in such
form significantly more often than the ad-server hostname. The ad-servers are always
referred by another ad-server or by the web page where the advertisement is located.
For this algorithm, we can use only HTTP flows and inspected HTTPS flows as the
HTTPS flows do not contain the information about the referrer and path in the URL.
The automatic white-listing algorithm uses all available flows with the information
about the referrer and the ad-server hostnames generated by the advertisement propa-
gation algorithm, which should be white-listed. Firstly, the algorithm checks if the flow
is inspected HTTPS or HTTP. Then the algorithm checks if the flow does not have
referrer and then if the URL does not contain the path. To conclude, the flow that
has the information about referrer, but its referrer field is empty, and the URL of the
flow does not contain the path, represents direct visit of the destination hostname. The
hostname is white-listed, if it was directly visited more than ten times.
We define the automatic white-listing algorithm in the following way. We have initial
set of web flows 𝐹 = (𝑓1, ..., 𝑓𝑛). Each web flow contains a set of information about URL,
hostname and content type and it can optionally contain the information about the
referrer URL and referrer hostname. Then we have set of results from the advertisement
propagation algorithm 𝑆 = 𝑠1, ..., 𝑠𝑛. Each result 𝑠𝑖 = (𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 ) is potential ad-server
hostname. The result of the Algorithm (3) is a set𝐾 of ad-server hostnames 𝑘𝑖 = (𝑘ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 )
without non-ad-server hostnames.
6.4.2 The Advertisement Network Mining Algorithm
The proposed advertisement network mining algorithm that combines all previously
described algorithms. The algorithm takes as an input set of flows and information
about one advertisement provider. Then the algorithm exploits given knowledge and
generates almost four hundred thousand ad-servers hostnames, which are able label
both, HTTP and HTTPS traffic.
The advertisement network mining algorithm uses all available flows and one adver-
tisement provider restriction. Then the advertisement propagation algorithm is applied
to the input data. The white-listing algorithm is applied to the result of the advertise-
ment propagation algorithm. The advertisement back propagation extends the knowl-
edge of advertisement providers, and top fifteen is taken as an extended input for the
second run of advertisement propagation algorithm. Finally, the result is white-listed
and generated domains can be used as advertisement indicators. The illustration of the
advertisement network mining algorithm is in Figure 15.
The algorithm consists of several steps and combines previously described algorithms
in this Chapter. As was previously mentioned, the input for our advertisement net-
work mining algorithm is set of web flows 𝐹 = (𝑓1, ..., 𝑓𝑛) and the restriction of one
advertisement provider 𝐴 = (𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛). Each web flow contains a set of infor-
mation about URL, hostname and content type and optionally the information about
the referrer URL and referrer hostname. The output is a set of ad-server hostnames
𝑀 = {𝑚1, ...,𝑚𝑛}. The advertisement network mining algorithm is described in pseudo-
code in the Algorithm (4).
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Algorithm 3 White-listing algorithm
1: function whiteListing(𝐹, 𝑆)
2: 𝐿 = {}
3: for all 𝑓𝑖 ∈ 𝐹 do
4: if ∃𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 : 𝑓ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 equals 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗 then
5: if 𝑓𝑖 is HTTP 𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑖 is inspected HTTPS then
6: if 𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖 is empty then
7: if 𝑓𝑈𝑅𝐿𝑖 not contains path then
8: if ∃𝑙𝑘 ∈ 𝐿 : (𝑙ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑘 equals 𝑓ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 ) then
9: 𝑙𝑘 ← (𝑙ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑘 , 𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑘 + 1)
10: else
11: 𝐿 = 𝐿 ∪ {(𝑓ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 , 1)}
12: end if
13: end if
14: end if
15: end if
16: end if
17: end for
18: 𝐾 = {}
19: for all 𝑙𝑖 ∈ 𝐿 do
20: if 𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖 > 10 then
21: 𝐾 = 𝐾 ∪ {𝑓ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 }
22: end if
23: end for
return 𝐾
24: end function
Figure 15 The illustration of the advertisement network mining algorithm. The light red dot is
the initial advertisement provider, the light green dots are ad-server hostnames generated by
the first run of the advertisement propagation algorithm, and the sharp green dots represent
new ad-servers hostnames generated by the second run of the advertisement propagation
algorithm. The arrow 𝑥 −→ 𝑦 means the relation, 𝑥 refers 𝑦.
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Algorithm 4 The advertisement network mining algorithm
1: 𝐴 = {𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒}
2: function advertisementNetworkMining(𝐹, 𝐴)
3: 𝑆 = advertisementPropagation(𝐹, 𝐴)
4: 𝑆 = whiteListing(𝐹, 𝑆)
5: 𝐷 = advertisementBackPropagation(𝐹, 𝑆)
6: 𝐷 = takeTop15HostWithTheHighestNumberOfOccurences(𝐷)
7: 𝑀 = advertisementPropagation(𝐹, 𝐷)
8: 𝑀 = whiteListing(𝐹, 𝑀)
return 𝑀
9: end function
6.5 Conclusion of advertisement traffic detection
To conclude, we exploit several techniques for advertisement traffic detection.
First, we start with pattern matching with available knowledge at the Internet, the
first knowledge was Yoyo ad-block list and then EasyList. Nevertheless, these methods
have the low recall, and they have to be manually updated.
Second, we explore the ad-networks and propose the advertisement network mining
algorithm, which extends previous approaches and generates the list of ad-servers host-
names. The advantage of the proposed method is that it is automatic, does not need
human maintenance and thus it can be easily automatically updated. The generated
labels can for both types of traffic, HTTP and HTTPS.
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detection
In this chapter, we evaluate methods for advertisement detection proposed in Chapter 6.
The first part of this chapter describes the evaluation of the results of the proposed al-
gorithm for advertisement detection. The second part evaluates and compares different
approaches for advertisement detection.
7.1 Evaluation of the results of proposed Advertisement
Network Mining Algorithm
In this section, we evaluate each step and result of the advertisement network mining
algorithm. The advertisement network mining algorithm, described in Section 6.4.2,
is initialised with the set of flows and the initial set of restrictions of advertisement
providers. The initial set contains restriction for one particular structure of the exist-
ing advertisement provider. The restriction consist of regular expression for the URL
in the form of "http(s)://tcp\.googlesyndication\.com/safeframe/.*" and content type
limitation to image. As the advertisement network mining algorithm consists of sev-
eral sub-algorithms, we evaluate each sub-algorithm separately to show the algorithm
working process.
The first step is the advertisement propagation algorithm which takes all input pa-
rameters of the advertisement mining algorithm and generates advertisement provider’s
hostnames. These hostnames are then white-listed with the white-listing algorithm,
described in Section 6.4.1. The white-listing algorithm filters the set of advertisement
providers hostnames generated from the advertisement propagation algorithm. This
step leads to 7 046 generated hostnames of ad-servers.
The result of the first step was manually verified to confirm that it includes only
hostnames of ad-servers. The other evaluation of this step is the fact that if this step
would contains a significant amount of false positives, it would massively negatively
impact the following stages of the advertisement network mining algorithm and its
results.
The second step is the advertisement back-propagation algorithm, described in Sec-
tion 6.2.1, which takes as an input set of flows and the result from the previous step
(ad-server’s hostnames). It generates set of advertisement providers domain names.
Out of the result, only top fifteen domain names were taken for the next step of the
advertisement network mining algorithm. The top domain names of advertisement
providers are in Table 3. We took only top fifteen domain names in order to be able
to be sure that they are related only to the advertisement delivery process. Thus, they
are not introducing false positives in the next step or the propagation.
We manually evaluat all top fifteen domain names, and all of them were true adver-
tisement providers.
The last step is the second run of the advertisement propagation algorithm with
the set of flows and set of restrictions on hostnames generated from domain names of
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top advertisement providers, and generates set of advertisement providers hostnames.
These hostnames are then white-listed with the white-listing algorithm.
Finally, the last step generates 384 863 hostnames of different ad-servers.
We manually evaluated the result of the last step. Our strategy, to manually analyse
as many hostnames as possible, was to check the most popular hostnames in our dataset
because the most popular hostnames would generate a significant amount of false pos-
itives. The other strategy was to group the hostnames by their second-level domain
name and evaluate each domain name if it belongs to some advertisement provider.
Our evaluation proves that generated hostnames are exclusively related to advertise-
ment servers, and no popular non-advertisement server occurs. Manual evaluation is
the only possible evaluation method for us to find out if the generated set of ad-servers
contains any FPs. However, very rarely some non-popular non-ad-servers can appear.
It can happen due to loss of part of the information while extracting hostnames from the
URLs because some small servers can be used for serving advertisement and at the same
time for other non-advertisement related purposes, and the discriminate information is
hidden in the path of the URL.
As the online world of advertisement is complex and not generally well structured, it
is hard or even impossible to measure the recall (the coverage) of our algorithm. The
most relevant way, how to measure the coverage, we have an access to, is to compare
our result with Cisco Cloudlock list ??. The Cisco Cloudlock list contains 793 manu-
ally evaluated hostnames of top ad-servers, which appear in our dataset that generate
4 304 542 901 flows in our dataset. Proposed network mining algorithm covers 603 out
of 793 Cloudlock ad-servers domain. Hence, the proposed algorithm has coverage 76%
on hostnames.
However, proposed network mining algorithm covers 3 849 660 860 flows out of
4 304 542 901 flows detected by the Cisco Cloudlock list as an advertisement in our
data. Hence, the proposed algorithm has coverage 89% on flows.
Although, we do not discover 190 hostnames from the Cisco Cloudlock list, which is
24% of total number of Cloudlock list hostnames, we do not cover only 454 882 041
flows covered by the Cloudlock list, which is 11% of total number of flows detected
by the Cloudlock list. Hence, we cover all top ad-servers, which generates majority
of advertisement flows according to Cloudlock list, however some of the less noisy are
missing. As they are less noisy they do not propagate to our advertisement network
mining. However, the result is sufficient enough to cover majority of the advertisement
traffic and we prove that at least half of the detected traffic by the advertisement
network mining algorithm are true positives.
7.2 Comparison of different advertisement detection
techniques
In this section, we compare different advertisement detection techniques, described in
Chapter 6 with the Cloudlock list used as ground truth for the advertisement network
mining algorithm in the previous section.
First, we compare the power of each approach regarding the number of ad-server’s
hostnames covered by each method. In Figure 16, we compare Yoyo ad-block list
(Yoyo), EasyList ad-block list (EasyList), the result of advertisement mining algorithm
(Mining) and Cloudlock list (Cloudlock).
We can see that the advertisement network mining algorithm covers significantly
more ad-servers hostnames than the rest of the methods. Precisely, the advertisement
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Domain names of Hostname variations Occurrence
casalemedia.com 3280 103194
rfihub.com 3895 89492
doubleclick.net 8809 71598
adnxs.com 23 11352
googlesyndication.com 4 8449
openx.net 45 6426
adnxs.com 23 11352
amazon-adsystem.com 20 6514
credio.com 37 3337
adroll.com 8 2260
appnexus.com 1 3380
viglink.com 4 2956
pubmatic.com 11 1347
viglink.com 4 2953
Table 3 Table with top advertisement providers from the advertisement back-propagation
algorithm. The first number is number of variation of the hostname for given domain name;
the second number is number of flows related to ad-servers with the domain name as referrer.
Figure 16 Comparison of different advertisement detection techniques on hostnames.
mining algorithm identifies 384 863 hostnames in our dataset as ad-servers out of total
31 313 560 hostnames. Thus, according to the Network Mining Algorithm, the ad-
servers hostnames take 1.4% of the total number of hostnames.
Second, we compare the power of each advertisement detection approach regarding
the number of advertisement flows they are able to detect. In Figure 17, we can see the
comparison of Yoyo ad-block list (Yoyo), EasyList ad-block list (EasyList), the result
of advertisement mining algorithm (Mining), Cloudlock list (Cloudlock) and the total
number of flows in our dataset (Total).
We can see that the Advertisement Network Mining Algorithm detects the most ad-
vertisement flows. Particularly, the Advertisement Network Mining Algorithm identifies
8 574 591 399 flows out of total 41 403 764 161 flows in our dataset as an advertisement.
Nevertheless, the Cloudlock list also detects a significant portion of an advertisement,
particularly 4 304 542 901.
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Figure 17 Comparison of different advertisement detection techniques on flows.
To conclude, the ad-block lists (Yoyo and EasyList) do not have a good results in
advertisement detection. Although, the Cloudlock list, used as the ground truth for the
Advertisement Mining Algorithm, contains a low number of hostnames in comparison
with the rest of the methods, however, it can detect a significant number of advertise-
ment flows. Nevertheless, proposed Network Mining Algorithm can detect significantly
more advertisement flows than any other examined technique. Particularly, we discover
that 20, 7% of the traffic is related to the advertisement.
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The main part of technical work presented in this thesis is based on the Anomaly De-
tection. This chapter introduces theoretical background used for solving and modelling
the advertisement frauds.
8.1 Intrusion detection system
In an information system, intrusion detection is the process used to identify intrusions.
The intrusions are the activities that violate the security policy of the system.
The intrusion detection is used for many host-based or networked computer systems,
where a collection of different kinds of data contains operating system calls, network
traffic, or other activity in the system.
8.1.1 Usage of intrusion detection systems in network security
Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are usually deployed as a second line of
defence that protects information systems, after firewalls, proxies, intrusion prevention
systems and other perimeter devices. The primary purpose of NIDS is to detect the
network attacks that successfully breached the first line of defence.
Intrusion can happen due to inadequate information security software engineering
practice and computer systems applications design flaws or bugs. The other problem
is that attacks are becoming more and more sophisticated and with increasing number
of encrypted traffic harder to detect. All these vulnerabilities can be used by an at-
tacker to attack the system or application without any notice of first-line defence (e.g.
firewalls). To be able to reduce the potential damage of intruded malware, the second
line of defence is needed and should be deployed along with other preventive security
mechanisms as a part of a comprehensive defence system. The NIDS represents such a
second line defence.
When the intrusion is detected in the system, an alarm is raised, and network ad-
ministrator has to analyse and determine the existence and scope of the damage, repair
it and improve the defence infrastructure against future attacks.
8.1.2 Categorization of intrusion detection systems
IDS can be categorised according to Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Sys-
tems [26] to the following categories by different criteria.
∙ First, we can categorise IDS by their location in the network. Based on it, IDS is
capable of detecting different types of intrusions. The IDS can be categorised as
a wired network-base, a wireless network-base or a host-based.
– The wired network-based IDS monitors network traffic for particular network
segments or divides and analyses the network and application protocol activ-
ity to identify suspicious activity.
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– The wireless network-base IDS monitors wireless network traffic and analyses
its wireless networking protocols to identify suspicious activity involving the
protocols themselves.
– The host-based IDS monitors the characteristics of a single host and the
events occurring within that host for suspicious activity.
∙ Second, we can categorise IDS by their detection methodology. It is the most rel-
evant categorisation for this thesis. Hence, the description is more detailed. Most
IDS combine multiple detection methodologies, but the main detection method-
ologies are as follows:
– The signature-based methods compare known threat signatures to observed
events to identify the intrusion. The signatures are created based on the
knowledge from previously identified and delineate attacks. However, cre-
ating signatures is time-consuming and specific expert knowledge is needed.
Thus, this method can be advantageous at detecting already known attacks,
but these attacks can use smart evasion techniques rendering this method
non-applicable. Other limitations of this method are the increasing number
of encrypted traffic, use of self-modifying malware and other evasion tech-
niques.
– The stateful protocol analysis relies on vendor-developed universal profiles
that specify how particular protocols should and should not be used. This
analysis of "normal" and generally "expected" behaviour of protocols is used
for each protocol state against observed events to identify deviations. The
weakness of stateful protocol analysis is difficulty or impossibility to develop
entirely accurate models of protocols, and restriction to the attacks that
violate the characteristics of generally acceptable protocol behaviour.
– The anomaly-based intrusion detection approach is used in this thesis. The
fundamental idea behind anomaly-based intrusion detection systems is that
an attacker behaviour will be noticeably different from that of a legitimate
user and these deviations will be detectable. The anomaly-based intrusion
detection system relies on building a statistical model of a normal behaviour
and detecting all significant deviations from it. The strength of this approach
is that it tries to decrease the human work, mainly manual creation of signa-
tures, and it can be very effective at detecting previously unknown threats.
The weakness is that it is hard to develop the statistical model of "normal"
behaviour that would not include malicious activity and that would be suf-
ficiently complex to reflect the real-world problem. These issues often lead
to comparatively higher false alarm rate, and that is why the pattern based
IDS are still widely used even when they are not able to detect new types of
attack.
8.2 Anomaly detection
Anomaly detection is a technique of Outlier Analysis, which is design to detect/classify
outlier data points.
An outlier data point is significantly different from the remaining data. The formal
Hawkins’s definition of an outlier is following:
"An outlier is an observation which deviates so much from the other observations as
to arouse suspicions that it was generated by a different mechanism."
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Figure 18 The spectrum from normal data to outliers [27].
Outlier point is also referred as an anomalous point. In most cases, anomalous points
are the result of generating process which behaves in an unusual way instead of 0ingbe
generated by the normal process, which reflects normal activity in the system. Thus,
the data points have a "normal" model, and anomalous points are deviations from this
normal model. The worth of such anomalous data points is that they can contain
useful information about abnormal characteristics of the systems, which impact the
data generation process. Such recognition of anomalous data points provides valuable
application-specific insights. In our case, we want to discover abnormal usage of online
advertisement.
In many real-world applications, it is often a subjective judgement what is a suffi-
cient deviation for a point to be considered as an outlier. The dataset can contain a
significant amount of noise which we do not mark as an anomalous data point. Only
the significantly interesting deviations are usually anomalous points [27].
8.2.1 Unsupervised Anomaly detection
When previously seen examples of anomalous data points are not available, we speak
about the unsupervised scenario. Then the noise represents the semantic boundary
between normal data and true anomalies because it does not always meet the robust
criteria necessary for a data point to be considered anomalous enough. Therefore, the
noise is often modelled as a weak form of outliers, and most of the outlier detection
algorithms use some quantified measure of the anomalousness of a data point. Thus,
we can represent this property in following way. Every data point lies on a continuous
spectrum from normal data to noise, and finally to anomalies as shown in Figure 18.
The separation of the individual regions of this spectrum is often not precisely defined,
and the delimiter is chosen on an ad-hoc basis according to application-specific criteria.
Furthermore, the separations are not pure, and many noisy data points may be deviant
enough to be interpreted as anomalies by the outlier score. Thus, the separation criteria
are rather up to the expert in the application area to design it [27].
8.2.2 Supervised Anomaly detection
The critical property to distinguish anomalous point from the noise is that anomalies
need to be unusual in an interesting way. Thus supervision process re-defines what
is interesting. It means that supervised methods need to be designed for application-
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specific anomaly detection. We distinguish several levels of supervision in practical
scenarios.
The first level is a fully supervised scenario when examples of both normal and
abnormal data are available and can be readily distinguished.
The second level is semi-supervised scenarios where we do not have samples for both
classes. In one semi-supervised scenario, examples of outliers are available, but the
examples of "normal" data may also contain outliers in some unknown proportion.
In another semi-supervised scenario, only examples of normal data or only examples of
anomalous data are available. The variation of the problem depends on the application,
and each variation requires a related but dedicated set of techniques [27].
8.2.3 The data model for anomaly detection
Data model is a crucial part of the design of anomaly detection algorithm. The data
model describes normal patterns in the data, and then an outlier score of a given data
point is computed by the deviation from these patterns by evaluating the quality of the
fit between data point and model.
An incorrect choice of the data model may lead to poor results. Therefore, the selec-
tion of the model and correct formulation of the initial hypothesis has to be determined
by the specialist’s understanding of the kind of deviation relevant to the application [27].
The basic oulier models according to [27] are following:
∙ Extreme Value Analysis, in the basic form, is on 1-dimensional data. The key is
to determine the statistical tails of the underlying distribution. The values which
are either too large or too small are outlisers.
∙ In Probabilistic and statistical model, the key assumption is about the choice of
the data distribution with which the modelling is performed and parameters of
this model are learned.
∙ Liner model models the data into lower dimensional embedded subspaces with the
use of linear correlations.
∙ Proximity-based model models outliers as points which are isolated from the re-
maining data. These can be done by cluster analysis, density-based analysis or
nearest neighbour analysis.
∙ Information theoretic model uses summarization methods to provide a small sum-
mary of the data, the deviations from which are flagged as outliers.
8.2.4 Categorization
According to [27], anomaly detectors can be categorised into following categories. Firstly,
we can categorise it based on the fact that they use some normal user model continu-
ously learned from the data into two groups: static and adaptive.
∙ The static detectors exploit domain knowledge and use a small subset of features
and thresholding to detect new anomalous points.
∙ The adaptive detectors maintain models of normal user behaviour or normal
network stat and label the deviations from the models as anomalous.
Secondly, we can divide anomaly detectors into two groups based on the type of the
output they are producing. The output can be label or score.
∙ The score is a soft decision representing the level of "outlierness" for each observed
data point. The advantage of the scoring output is that data points are comparable
by their outlier tendency and it retains all the information provided by a particular
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algorithm. However, it does not provide a concise division between anomalous and
normal data points.
∙ The label is a hard decision where each data point has a normal or anomalous
label. Although some algorithms directly return binary labels, most of the anomaly
detection produce outlier scores. The standard practice is to use thresholding to
transform the continuous values to binary labels. Unfortunately, binary labels
contain less information, but it provides the final decision which is needed for
decision making in practical applications.
8.3 Limitation of anomaly-based intrusion detection system
Although anomaly detection can discover unknown patterns of attacks, it suffers from
several problems that need to be discussed before anomaly detection is deployed. These
problems include Big Data, the anomaly detector has to process, potential adversarial
attack, costly false positive alarms, class imbalance and lack of training and validation
data.
8.3.1 Big Data
Network security, where we are applying anomaly detection, is a Big Data problem.
Every user connected to the Internet generates network traffic and employees of com-
panies, can together generate easily terabytes of data per day. Thus, we speak about
Big Data because the amount of data increase rapidly every day.
Hence, we need to design solution which has low computational space and complexity.
8.3.2 Adversarial attack to anomaly detection
When the attackers know about such detection technique as anomaly detection of the
particular type of fraud, then they can adapt their malicious behaviour to fit under the
limit of anomalous events. Thus, they make the task of defining normal behaviour even
more difficult [28].
8.3.3 Costly false positive alarms
The current anomaly detection approaches usually suffer from a high false-alarm rate
and each false positive alarm is very expensive [29]. The network administrator has
to react to such false-alarm event, do the deep analysis of the incident to disproof
the maliciousness of the event. Such analysis can take up to several working days of
the network administrator. Therefore, the research goal is to develop precise anomaly
detectors or to find a trade-off between false positives and true positives rate.
8.3.4 Class imbalance
From the definition of anomalies, that anomalies are rare instances in the data, it is
expected that class of normal data will be more significant than the class of anomalous
data points. Thus the design of supervised techniques used in the anomaly detection
should take into consideration this fact.
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8.3.5 Labelled data for training and validation
Availability of labelled data for training and validation of statistical models used by
anomaly detection is usually an issue. The biggest problem is that anomalies are domain
specific and number and type of anomalies vary for each environment. If we would have
labelled data for a particular domain and the anomaly we are interested in detecting,
it will be pointless to create an anomaly detector. Thus, with such natural property of
anomaly, it is almost impossible to have precise data for real word problem. It would
be difficult, time-consuming and expensive to develop such data set.
8.3.6 Feature selection
The crucial moment in building anomaly detection models is to pick the features to be
used as the input of the statistical model since strong prior expert knowledge is needed.
Incorrect feature selection can lead to poor results of anomaly detector.
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For detecting the advertisement fraud in the network traffic, we use anomaly detection
approach. In this chapter, we describe the CTA system, advertisement fraud anomaly
detector, and incorporation of our advertisement fraud anomaly detector into the CTA
system.
9.1 CTA
Proposed advertisement fraud anomaly detector will be part of the Cognitive Threat
Analytics (CTA) anomaly detection system, which we describe in detail in this section
to be able to explain the integration of our anomaly detector into the CTA system.
The CTA system is developed by Cisco systems. It analyses HTTP proxy logs,
produced by Web proxy servers located on a network perimeter, to detect infected
computers within the network. The CTA anomaly detection system consists of four
main layers. The structure of the system is depicted in Figure 19.
The first layer analyses all network traffic data by set of 70 anomaly detectors. Each
detector works with a set of selected features that allows identifying specific malicious
behaviour by applying various low complexity algorithms enabling the near real-time
analysis of the enormous amount of network data. The anomaly detectors are of two
different categories.
In the first category, the anomaly detectors are based on a direct application of
Figure 19 The Cognitive Threat Analystics anomaly detection architecture containing four
layers [30].
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statistical methods on a selected subset of traffic features. The promising approach to
statistical anomaly detection is identified and tested on a large number of traffic feature
projections and select one or more combinations.
In the second category, the anomaly detectors are knowledge-based. The development
starts by noticing exploitable characteristics of network traffic and analyses whether
the traits are relevant for the detection of a network attack. Then the characteristics
features are designed and the most straightforward detection algorithm is applied to
the features.
Both categories of detectors complement each other and help to achieve better effi-
cacy.
Even though the high sensitivity of the individual detectors is a crucial element of any
intrusion detection system, no individual detector can achieve a high enough precision
to be useful on its own. Therefore, the ensemble approach is applied.
The second layer aggregates the results from the previous layer by two parallel en-
semble systems [31]. The first ensemble system is Evangelista aggregation which use
mean of mean and maximum scores of the scores assigned by the individual detectors
within the ensemble, as it should be more robust to the presence of poor detectors with-
out knowing which ones are poor. The second ensemble system is parallel aggregation
which use labelled data of currently known malicious samples to improve the recall of
the whole system on the known network attacks or malware.
The third layer contains several Local Adaptive Multivariate Smoothing (LAMS)
models [32], which are designed to reduce the number of false positives of the whole
detection system by smoothing the outputs of the ensembles over time and feature space
to have the more robust estimate of the true anomaly.
The last layer aggregates the results of individual LAMS models using Evangelista
and parallel aggregation ensemble systems. The results of these two ensemble systems
are aggregated into the final anomaly score using the mean of the individual anomaly
scores of each network flow.
9.2 Advertisement fraud anomaly detector
Online advertisement is an inseparable part of the majority of web pages. We expect
that if the user is infected with some adware then the portion of his traffic related to
advertisement increases.
The normal behaviour of the user while browsing the Internet consist of loading
Web pages, where the non-advertisement flows come first and then they are optionally
followed by the flows related to the advertisement.
The deviant behaviour of the infected user is when the significant portion of adver-
tisement flows appear after non-advertisement flows or if non-advertisement flows are
missing between the advertisement flows.
The advertisement fraud anomaly detector should give the high score for the users
who are infected with some adware. Hence, their traffic contains enormous portion
of advertisement flows to gain as much money as possible to generate profit for the
attacker.
9.2.1 Feature design
The proposed advertisement fraud anomaly detection algorithm is based on the fact
that the normal users consume the amount of advertisement flows proportional to the
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amount of non-advertisement flows. The advertisement flows are detected by our net-
work mining algorithm (see Section 6.4.2). We reflect the relationship between adver-
tisement flows and non-advertisement flows in the ratio in the following way.
We design the feature for each user 𝑢 as a ratio 𝛿(𝑢) of number of user’s advertisement
flows 𝛼(𝑢) and total number of user’s flows 𝜏(𝑢),
𝛿(𝑢) = 𝛼(𝑢)
𝜏(𝑢) . (1)
This relation reflects the general relationship between advertisement flows and non-
advertisement flows, that advertisement flows should not appear without the non-
advertisement flows. The ratio gives us information, what portion of user’s traffic
is the advertisement traffic. We expect that advertisement flows will not take more
than half of the traffic of a normal user, because otherwise it would mean that the main
content which the user consumes at the Internet is an advertisement. Hence, we expect
that majority of normal users will have the ratio 𝛿(𝑢) smaller than 0.5 and infected
users will have the ratio close to 1.
However, the disadvantage of this feature is the precondition that we have to have
proper labels of advertisement and non-advertisement flows. The advertisement de-
tection is discussed in detail in Chapter 6 where we proposed the new algorithm for
advertisement network mining. The other problem is that part of the user’s traffic
is non-encrypted (HTTP) and part is encrypted (HTTPS). The non-encrypted traffic
generates significantly more flows than the encrypted traffic because for the HTTPS we
can see only initial connection to set up the tunnel and the rest of the flows we do not
see as it is described in Section 5.3. But we expect that this will not be a significant
problem because the ratio of the number of advertisement flows and non-advertisement
flows should stay the same. Even in HTTPS, we see the initial connection to load the
content of web page and the initial connection to load the advertisement.
We compute the ratio for each user in our one-week data who was connected to the
Internet for at least four days. It means that the difference between their first and last
connection to the Internet was at least four days and they produce at least 10K flows
during the week. We need this restriction because in another way the ratio would be
skewed. For example, the user who connects only for a few minutes and has already
loaded the page with advertisement would have only the advertisement flows because
the web page will load only new advertisement but no non-advertisement traffic.
The distribution of proposed feature is in Figure 20. The y-axis is in the logarithmic
scale because the number of users with the value of the ratio close to the zero is the
majority. The ratio was computed for 57 312 users. Out of the total number of users,
12 660 (22%) users have the ratio lower than 0.1, and 41 442 (72%) users have the ratio
lower than 0.5. Only 1850 (3%) users have the ratio higher than 0.8.
9.2.2 Anomaly score: Z-value test
The anomaly score for our algorithm is calculated using a statistical model for outlier
analysis known as Z-value test [27]. The score is defined in following way:
Consider a set of 1-dimensional quantitative data observations, denoted by 𝑋1...𝑋𝑁 ,
with mean 𝜇 and standard deviation 𝜎. The Z-value for the data point 𝑋𝑖 is denoted
by 𝑍𝑖 , and is defined as follows:
𝑍𝑖 =
𝑋𝑖 − 𝜇
𝜎
. (2)
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Figure 20 Distribution of advertisement ratio.
Figure 21 Z-score distribution.
The Z-value test computes the number of standard deviations by which the data
varies from the mean. This definition of anomaly has an implicit assumption that the
data is drawn from a normal distribution. When this is not the case, the corresponding
Z-values needs to be interpreted carefully [27].
The anomaly score for ratio feature is in Figure 21, where the y-axis is in the loga-
rithmic scale. We can see that the anomaly score distribution has a heavy tail on the
right with blob close to the 2.5𝜎. These users close to 2.5𝜎 can be suspect from being
infected with adware.
9.2.3 Normalisation / Unifying outlier scores
The advertisement fraud anomaly detector will be part of CTA network intrusion de-
tection systems, and for this reason, we need our outlier score to be comparable with
other anomaly detectors in the system.
Since different outlier scores may differ in their meaning, range, and the contrast be-
tween different outlier models, they are not easily comparable or interpretable. The other
39
9 Advertisement fraud detection
problem, with varying scores of the outlier, is that they often lack the contrast between
outliers and inliers.
Hence, if we want to compare or combine output score of several anomaly detectors
easily, we need to unify the outlier scores and facilitate types of functions to transform
an outlier score to a comparable, normalised value in the range [0, 1] or even to a
probability value.
Any framework for transforming outlier scores [33] has to grantee that the resulting
score fulfils the term of regularity and normality and the transformation is ranking-
stable.
∙ An outlier score 𝑆 is called regular if 𝑆(𝑜) ≥ 0 for any object 𝑜, 𝑆(𝑜) ≈ 0 if 𝑜 is
an inlier, and 𝑆(𝑜)≫ 0 if 𝑜 is an outlier.
∙ An outlier score 𝑆 is called normal if 𝑆 is regular and the values are restricted
by 𝑆(𝑜) ∈ [0, 1].
∙ The transformation of an outlier score 𝑇𝑆 is ranking-stable, when it does not
change the ordering obtained by the original score. Formally the ranking-stable
transformation fulfil the requirement for any 𝑜1, 𝑜2 :
𝑆(𝑜1) ≤ 𝑆(𝑜1)⇒ 𝑇𝑆(𝑜1) ≤ 𝑇𝑆(𝑜2) (3)
Formally, we can apply two steps in the process of unification scores, where either
step can be optional. First, we can apply regularisation 𝑅𝑒𝑔 that transforms a score 𝑆
onto the interval [0,∞) such that 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑆(𝑜) ≈ 0 for inliers and 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑆(𝑜)≫ 0 for outliers.
Second, normalisation transforms a score onto the interval [0, 1]. Both steps can be
used to enhance the contrast between inliers and outliers. Thus even an already normal
scores can be unified to stretch interesting regions and shrink irrelevant intervals.
The simplest normalisation method is a linear transformation. It brings an outlier
score onto a normalised scale by applying a linear transformation. The minimum score is
mapped to 0, and the maximum score is mapped to 1. Then simple linear normalisation
is obtained by:
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑆 (0) :=
𝑆(𝑜)− 𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 (4)
This simple method maps values to the normalised interval, but it does not add any
contrast to the distribution of scores. Thus, we search for other methods to enhance
the difference between inliers and outliers based on some exemplary statistical scaling
methods.
For the integration our anomaly detector into CTA, we use more complicated Gaus-
sian Scaling method proposed by Kriegel at al. [33], which enhance the contrast be-
tween inliers and outliers based on exemplary statistical scaling methods. The method
is based on the precondition that according to the central limit theorem, the most gen-
eral distribution for values derived from a large number of similarly distribute values is
the normal distribution. The method is not susceptible to over-fit because it has just
two degrees of freedom, the mean 𝜇 and the standard deviation 𝜎.
The normalisation 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑔𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑆 (𝑜) of the anomaly score 𝑆(𝑜) is assigned to each user
𝑜 ∈ 𝑂 by the anomaly detector 𝑆. Then we have the mean 𝜇𝑆 and the standard devia-
tion 𝜎𝑆 of the set of derived values using the outlier score 𝑆. These can be estimated
from the data using ̂︁𝜇𝑆 = 𝐸(𝑆) and ̂︁𝜎𝑆 = √︀𝐸(𝑆2)− 𝐸(𝑆)2 in a single run or adap-
tively adjusted when running in an on-line scenario. Finally, we can use these values
to compute cumulative distribution function and the Gaussian error function 𝑒𝑟𝑓().
The Gaussian Error Function 𝑒𝑟𝑓() satisfy an important property of transformations
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Figure 22 The approximation of Error function. The y-axis has values of PDF for Normal
distribution, Anomaly Error values of Error function and Anomaly Approximation values fo
rApproximation of Error function.
that they should not change the ordering obtained by the original score, because it
is monotone and thus ranking-stable. The equation for computing Gaussian Scaling
transformation is following:
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑔𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑆 (𝑜) := max
{︂
0, 𝑒𝑟𝑓
(︂
𝑆(𝑜)− 𝜇𝑆
𝜎𝑆 ·
√
2
)︂}︂
(5)
This transformation transforms the anomaly scores of an anomaly detector into prob-
ability estimates, where the probability of zero represents the normal user, aligned with
the model, whereas one indicates highly anomalous user.
The Gaussian Scaling method is based on Z-value score which is divided by the
constant
√
2 and transformed by the Gaussian error function.
Unfortunately, the Gaussian Error Function is computationally expensive, hence, it
is not convenient to use it in a solution for Big Data. Therefore, we approximate the
Gaussian Error Function as shown in the Figure 22. The approximation is zero for
negative values of 𝜎, and then the values from 0𝜎 to 1.85𝜎 are linearly scaled onto
the values from the interval [0, 1]. The values higher than 1.85𝜎 are equal to one. This
approximation function approximates the error function well enough for our application,
and it is easy to compute. Thus, we use proposed approximation function in the formula
for Gaussian Scaling transformation 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑔𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑆 (𝑜) instead of the error function.
The score transform in a such a way can be directly compared with another anomaly
score transformed in the same way, and they can be aggregated using many combination
techniques.
The normalised anomaly score is in the Figure 23, where the y-axis is in the logarith-
mic scale. We can see that the majority of users have the normalise anomaly score equal
to zero, and then the number of users decreases with increasing value of the normalised
anomaly score up to one. The users with the normalised anomaly score equal to one
take 0.28% of the total number of users. We can expect that these users are infected
with some adware and the probability that the user is infected with adware decrease
with decreasing value of the score.
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Figure 23 Distribution of normalised Z-score values.
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anomaly detector
In this chapter, we evaluate the advertisement fraud anomaly detector proposed in
Chapter 9. The available labels for anomaly detection are an issue. Hence, the evalua-
tion of proposed solution is limited as we usually want to discover new types of attacks
for which we do not have an intelligence. Nevertheless, we have an access to two dif-
ferent types of labels, but unfortunately, these labels do not perfectly fit our problem
as discussed in Section 10.1.2. Thus, we have to analyse the result of proposed solution
manually to get an appropriate information about the success rate in Section 10.2.2.
10.1 Evaluation with available labels
10.1.1 Long term adware captures
We have an access to long-term sandbox samples with different types of infection cap-
tured by Stratosphere IPS [34]. The advantage of these samples is that they are cap-
tured for a long period (weeks or months). On the other hand, the disadvantage of
these samples for our research is that they do not contain user interaction and they are
not categorised by the severity or the type of threat. Thus, we have to decide whether
the sample is related to advertisement fraud from the name of the sample, which is not
precise in all cases, or the behaviour in the sample. Hence, specific expert knowledge
is needed during the manipulation of the samples.
Unfortunately, the number of advertisement fraud oriented captures in the Strato-
sphere IPS dataset is limited. Particularly, we find only eight different types of captures
related to advertisement fraud, but they do not leave a significant ad-related footprint
in the captured network traces that could be detected by the proposed anomaly de-
tector. Hence, the anomaly score is very low for these samples. The list of analysed
samples with their probable names and number of identified advertisement requests
according to proposed advertisement network mining algorithm is in Table 4.
We manually evaluate the advertisement request labelling generated by proposed ad-
vertisement detection algorithm and all hostnames related to the advertisement are la-
belled correctly as the advertisement except "ad.bench.utorrent.com" and "cdn.bitmedianetwork.com",
which we do not detect as an advertisement. However, these hostnames are not popular
advertisement servers hostnames.
The low amount of network traffic related to advertisement delivery in analysed
samples may be caused by the lack of user interaction during the sandboxed run of the
malware sample or the revenue, which is generated by the huge amount of advertisement
requests, is not the primary objective of the analysed malware samples.
10.1.2 CTA threat intelligence
The CTA has threat intelligence, which contains manually created set of indicators of
compromise for different categories of threats. Several categories are related to adver-
tisement fraud as click fraud, ad-injection and malicious advertising. We analyse the
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Capture name Probable infection name Ad Total Ratio
CTU-Malware-Capture-Botnet-169-2 Miuref 435 18 583 0.02
CTU-Malware-Capture-Botnet-177-1 Adware.Win32.Amonetize.heur? 0 89 539 0.00
CTU-Malware-Capture-Botnet-337-1 Unknown.PUA 0 20 0.00
CTU-Malware-Capture-Botnet-237-1 PUA.Taobao 0 29 804 0.00
CTU-Malware-Capture-Botnet-222-1 PUP.Plumbytes 0 1 464 0.00
CTU-Malware-Capture-Botnet-193-1 Win32/Bundled.Toolbar.Google.D 14 1 064 0.00
CTU-Malware-Capture-Botnet-194-1 OpenCandy 3997 27 086 0.15
CTU-Malware-Capture-Botnet-199-1 MediaGet 142 4 051 0.04
Table 4 Overview of eight advertisement fraud related samples captured by Stratosphere IPS.
Figure 24 Distribution of normalised score of blacklisted users by CTA threat intelligence and
non-blacklisted users.
behaviour of users, which match the advertisement fraud categories, and only minority
of them has the malicious behaviour we are searching for. The majority of infected
users were not infected with advertisement fraud, which generates a huge volume of
advertisement requests to generate revenue.
The traffic of blacklisted users, which match the CTA advertisement fraud intelli-
gence, do not contain massive communication to popular ad-servers, only communica-
tion with the C&C. Hence, they cannot be taken as ground truth for proposed anomaly
detector. However, we can use it to evaluate the distribution of different advertisement
frauds against proposed anomaly detector score.
The distribution of blacklisted users is in Figure 24. We can see that the amount of
blacklisted users is meagre. Thus we have to use the log scale on the y-axis to be able to
evaluate it. Blacklisted users have variate behaviour regarding the anomaly score. This
indicates, that the advertisement fraud is a broad area, which can appear in different
forms.
10.2 Manual evaluation
In this section, we present our manual analysis of top 0.1% of most anomalous users
according to anomaly score, because available labels do not sufficiently cover the threats
we want to detect. First, we describe the methodology, we use to analyse the user traffic.
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Second, we present results of our analysis.
10.2.1 Methodology of manual analysis
Crucial part of every manual evaluation is analytic method, because it can significantly
reduce time of the analysis. We develop analytic method, which help us to recognise
advertisement fraud and minimise the time we have to spend with each user.
The methodology consists of frequency analysis of the occurrence of each hostname
the user visits and the knowledge if the hostname belongs to ad-server.
In each user traffic we search for:
∙ if the hostnames labelled as an ad-servers are the true ad-servers,
∙ if the distribution of hostnames contains normal user behaviour which could gen-
erate such amount of advertisement traffic,
∙ for C&C hostname, which would prove the infection.
All the most anomalous users, we analyse, have the portion of advertisement flows
higher than 95%. This is already strong indication of malicious behaviour related to
advertisement fraud. However, the users are not infected with advertisement fraud if
one of the following situation occurs:
∙ Some hostnames in a user traffic are labelled as an advertisement hostnames while
they are not. Hence, the ratio is negatively impacted by the inaccurate advertise-
ment detection algorithm.
∙ The massive advertisement traffic is generated by a legitimate behaviour in the
user traffic.
The manual analysis divide the users into the three following groups:
∙ The first group contains confirmed TP (true positives). The traffic of users from
this group does not contain user interaction at all or interaction which would
be responsible for the anomalous portion of advertisement. In addition, we find
hostname of C&C which was confirmed by some public threat intelligence, e.g.
ThreatGrid.
∙ The second group contains TP (true positives). The traffic of users from this group
does not contain user interaction at all or interaction which would be responsible
for the anomalous portion of advertisement.
∙ The last group contains FP (flase positives). Some hostnames in a user traffic
are wrongly labelled as ad-servers, while they are not the true ad-servers and it
negatively affect the ratio. The user traffic contains legitimate behaviour which
caused the enormous advertisement traffic.
10.2.2 Manual evaluation of proposed advertisement fraud anomaly
detector
We analyse 0.1% most anomalous users according to anomaly score and divide them
into three categories confirmed TP, TP and FP, described in Subsection 10.2.1. There is
73 most anomalous users with normalised score equal to one. All these users have more
than 96% of their traffic related to advertisement labelled by proposed advertisement
mining algorithm.
Out of 73 most anomalous users, we label 48 users as confirmed TP, 22 as TP and
three as FP.
Example of confirmed TP is one user, which massively communicates to popular
ad-server’s hostnames and to non-ad-hostname "Cj.dotomi.com". This hostname is
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according to available intelligence (Virustotal, Malwaretips, Fixyourbrowser, VirusRe-
search and Malwarefixes) related to pop-up ads. Thus, we can confirm from amount of
advertisement traffic and references for "Cj.dotomi.com" that the user is infected with
adware.
The users labelled as TP, contain in general massive communication to popular ad-
servers where one ad-server hostname is visited significantly more often than the other
ad-server’s hostnames.
All three FPs share the same behaviour, which does not contain user interaction.
They contain one hostname "query.yahooapis.com" with high occurrence, which is mis-
labelled as an advertisement even though it is a hostname that can be used for many
non-advertisement related purposes. This mislabelled advertisement hostname causes
increase of the anomaly score of the user.
To conclude, we show that our anomaly detector can detect new advertisement fraud,
which was not covered by the CTA threat intelligence before.
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11 Future Work
In this thesis, we open the chapter of advertisement fraud anomaly detection. Future
work concerns detection of other types of advertisement fraud and anomalous user
behaviour in the network.
The network mining algorithm for advertisement traffic detection described in Sec-
tion 6.4 creates many opportunities to deeply explore advertisement networks from the
user site or to detect other types of advertisement fraud as we are already able to
distinguish advertisement requests, which was the biggest issue of our research. The
following ideas could be tested:
∙ Threat Mining using several runs of ad-propagation and back-propagation can give
wider coverage of the advertisement providers and ad-servers they are serving.
∙ Modelling typical ad-server for popular sites to be able to detect ad-injections or
less noisy ad-frauds.
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The amount of online advertisement is growing significantly every year, and the process
of advertisement delivery to the audience is becoming more and more sophisticated.
It uses knowledge about previous user behaviour on the Internet to precisely target
the advertisement to the right user. The increasing revenue of online advertisement
attracts more and more attackers who are interested to explore new vulnerabilities
to find new ways to infect the broad audience with adware. Once the attackers find
the way to infect a user with adware, there is a high chance that adware escalates to
higher severity threats. As the attacker’s revenue is mainly related to the amount of
fake impressions, the attackers are motivated to create malware that generates a large
number of advertisement requests, which waste the resources. Subsequently, the high
number of advertisement requests can slow down user’s device and negatively impact
user experience while browsing the internet and also disturb the user’s privacy.
In Chapter 2, we review the related work in analysis and detection techniques of
advertisement frauds. However, the amount of research in this field is very limited and
mainly focused on the fraud detection from the ad-provider’s point of view. Therefore,
the existing state of the art in advertisement fraud detection cannot directly be applied
to the web proxy access log data.
In this thesis, we have first reviewed the process of advertisement delivery in Chap-
ter 3 with more detailed analysis of the advertisement delivery mechanism as seen by the
web proxies with a focus on the ad-exchange networks in Section 3.1.1. Additionally, in
Section 3.2, we review the existing advertisement fraud approaches with a description
of the approaches that generate a large number of malicious traffic. These are the types
that we focus on while designing our advertisement fraud anomaly detector.
In Chapter 6, we propose an algorithm to detect ad-related HTTP/HTTPS requests
captured by web proxies. The algorithm is able to extend a limited input information
about one particular structure of the existing advertisement provider to cover 384 863
ad-server’s hostnames. In Chapter 7, we show that the proposed algorithm can detect
ten times more ads than the conventional pattern matching approaches like Yoyo and
EasyList ad-block lists. Accordingly, we discovered that advertisement takes 20, 7% of
all traffic. Additionally, the proposed detection mechanism does not need any human
interventions nor manual updates, but can periodically run to detect new ad-servers
and ad-networks.
In Chapter 9, we propose a network anomaly detection algorithm that uses the above
detected ad-related traffic to model the percentage of the ad-related traffic for each user
in the monitored network. The ratio of the individual user is compared to the ratios of
all other users in the network to access the anomaly score of the user. In Section 9.2.3,
we propose a normalisation method for the anomaly score to be able to incorporate the
proposed anomaly detector into the existing Cognitive Threat Analytic anomaly-based
intrusion detection system, developed by Cisco Systems.
Finally, the proposed anomaly detector was evaluated on HTTP and HTTPS traffic
of 57 312 users giving us 73 most anomalous users. Out of 73 most anomalous users,
we manually label 48 users as confirmed TP with found C&C to prove the infection,
22 as TP with containing malicious behaviour but without found C&C to prove the
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infection, and three as FP.
We show that the proposed solution may be used for the detecting advertisement
fraud.
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∙ LATEXsource code of the Thesis
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